sigma_protocol_transfer - [devnet]

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The transfer NP relation ( $\mathcal{R}^{-}_\mathsf{txfer}$ )

$\def\old#1{{\color{red}{\dot{#1}}}}\def\new#1{{\color{teal}{\widetilde{#1}}}}\def\opt#1{{\color{orange}{\boldsymbol{[}}} #1 {\color{orange}{\boldsymbol{]}}}}$

A ZKPoK of a correct confidential transfer from sender to recipient. This is a composition of $\mathcal{R}^\mathsf{veiled}_\mathsf{withdraw}$ (the sender’s balance update with SECRET amount $\mathbf{v}$ ) and $\mathcal{R}_\mathsf{eq}$ (the transfer amount encrypted identically under all parties’ keys).

Notation

$\old{x}$ denotes a stale/old ciphertext component; $\new{x}$ denotes a fresh/new one.
$\opt{\cdot}$ denotes components present only when has_effective_auditor is true.
$\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = \sum_i x_i \cdot y_i$ denotes the inner product.
$\mathbf{B} = (B^0, B^1, \ldots)$ where $B = 2^{16}$ is the positional weight vector for chunk encoding.
$\ell$ : number of available balance chunks; $n$ : number of transfer (pending balance) chunks.
$T$ : number of voluntary auditors ( $T \ge 0$ ).
The effective auditor (if present) sees the sender’s new balance AND the transfer amount. Extra auditors see only the transfer amount.

The relation

\mathcal{R}^{-}_\mathsf{txfer}\left(\begin{array}{l} G, H, \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}, \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{rid}, \old{\mathbf{P}}, \old{\mathbf{R}}, \new{\mathbf{P}}, \new{\mathbf{R}}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{R}^\mathsf{sid}, \mathbf{R}^\mathsf{rid},\\ \opt{\mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{eff}, \new{\mathbf{R}}^\mathsf{eff}, \mathbf{R}^\mathsf{eff}},\; (\mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{ex}_i, \mathbf{R}^\mathsf{ex}_i)_{i \in [T]} \textbf{;}\\ \mathsf{dk}, \new{\mathbf{a}}, \new{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{r} \end{array}\right) = 1 \Leftrightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{r@{\,\,}l@{\quad}l} H &= \mathsf{dk} \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}\\ \new{P}_i &= \new{a}_i \cdot G + \new{r}_i \cdot H, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \new{R}_i &= \new{r}_i \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \opt{\new{R}^\mathsf{eff}_i} &\opt{= \new{r}_i \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{eff},} &\opt{\forall i \in [\ell]}\\ \langle \mathbf{B}, \old{\mathbf{P}} \rangle &= \mathsf{dk} \cdot \langle \mathbf{B}, \old{\mathbf{R}} \rangle + (\langle \mathbf{B}, \new{\mathbf{a}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{v} \rangle) \cdot G\\ P_j &= v_j \cdot G + r_j \cdot H, &\forall j \in [n]\\ R^\mathsf{sid}_j &= r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}, &\forall j \in [n]\\ R^\mathsf{rid}_j &= r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{rid}, &\forall j \in [n]\\ \opt{R^\mathsf{eff}_j} &\opt{= r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{eff},} &\opt{\forall j \in [n]}\\ R^\mathsf{ex}_{i,j} &= r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{ex}_i, &\forall j \in [n],\; \forall i \in [T]\\ \end{array}\right.

Homomorphism

This can be framed as a homomorphism check $\psi(\mathbf{w}) = f(\mathbf{X})$ where $\mathbf{w} = (\mathsf{dk}, \new{\mathbf{a}}, \new{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{r})$ is the witness and $\mathbf{X}$ is the statement.

The homomorphism $\psi$ is:

\psi(\mathsf{dk}, \new{\mathbf{a}}, \new{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{r}) = \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{dk} \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}\\ \new{a}_i \cdot G + \new{r}_i \cdot H, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \new{r}_i \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \opt{\new{r}_i \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{eff}, \;\forall i \in [\ell]}\\ \mathsf{dk} \cdot \langle \mathbf{B}, \old{\mathbf{R}} \rangle + (\langle \mathbf{B}, \new{\mathbf{a}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{v} \rangle) \cdot G\\ v_j \cdot G + r_j \cdot H, &\forall j \in [n]\\ r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}, &\forall j \in [n]\\ r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{rid}, &\forall j \in [n]\\ \opt{r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{eff}, \;\forall j \in [n]}\\ r_j \cdot \mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{ex}_i, &\forall j \in [n],\; \forall i \in [T]\\ \end{pmatrix}

The transformation function $f$ is:

f(\mathbf{X}) = \begin{pmatrix} H\\ \new{P}_i, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \new{R}_i, &\forall i \in [\ell]\\ \opt{\new{R}^\mathsf{eff}_i, \;\forall i \in [\ell]}\\ \langle \mathbf{B}, \old{\mathbf{P}} \rangle\\ P_j, &\forall j \in [n]\\ R^\mathsf{sid}_j, &\forall j \in [n]\\ R^\mathsf{rid}_j, &\forall j \in [n]\\ \opt{R^\mathsf{eff}_j, \;\forall j \in [n]}\\ R^\mathsf{ex}_{i,j}, &\forall j \in [n],\; \forall i \in [T]\\ \end{pmatrix}

use 0x1::bcs;
use 0x1::chain_id;
use 0x1::confidential_amount;
use 0x1::confidential_balance;
use 0x1::error;
use 0x1::fungible_asset;
use 0x1::object;
use 0x1::option;
use 0x1::ristretto255;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_fiat_shamir;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_proof;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_representation;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_representation_vec;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_statement;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_statement_builder;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_utils;
use 0x1::sigma_protocol_witness;
use 0x1::signer;
use 0x1::vector;

Constants

The number of auditor R components does not match the expected auditor count.

const E_AUDITOR_COUNT_MISMATCH: u64 = 6;

The homomorphism or transformation function implementation is not inserting points at the expected positions.

const E_STATEMENT_BUILDER_INCONSISTENCY: u64 = 7;

Index of dk (sender’s decryption key).

const IDX_DK: u64 = 0;

Index of $G$ (the Ristretto255 basepoint).

const IDX_G: u64 = 0;

Index of $H$ (the encryption key basepoint).

const IDX_H: u64 = 1;

old_P starts at index 4. Layout: old_P[1..ℓ], old_R[1..ℓ], new_P[1..ℓ], new_R[1..ℓ], amount_P[1..n], amount_R_sender[1..n], amount_R_recip[1..n] With effective auditor: …, ek_eff_aud, new_R_eff_aud[1..ℓ], amount_R_eff_aud[1..n] For each voluntary auditor t: …, ek_volun_auds[t], amount_R_volun_auds[t][1..n]

const START_IDX_OLD_P: u64 = 4;

new_a[0..ℓ-1] at 1..ℓ. new_r[0..ℓ-1] at 1+ℓ..2ℓ. v[0..n-1] at 1+2ℓ..1+2ℓ+n-1. r[0..n-1] at 1+2ℓ+n..1+2ℓ+2n-1. The transfer proof was invalid.

const E_INVALID_TRANSFER_PROOF: u64 = 5;

Index of $\mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{rid}$ (the recipient’s encryption key).

const IDX_EK_RECIP: u64 = 3;

Index of $\mathsf{ek}^\mathsf{sid}$ (the sender’s encryption key).

const IDX_EK_SENDER: u64 = 2;

Protocol ID used for domain separation

const PROTOCOL_ID: vector<u8> = [65, 112, 116, 111, 115, 67, 111, 110, 102, 105, 100, 101, 110, 116, 105, 97, 108, 65, 115, 115, 101, 116, 47, 84, 114, 97, 110, 115, 102, 101, 114, 86, 49];

Structs

`Transfer`

Phantom marker type for transfer statements.

struct Transfer has drop

Fields

dummy_field: bool

`TransferSession`

Used for domain separation in the Fiat-Shamir transform.

struct TransferSession has drop

Fields

sender: address
recipient: address
asset_type: object::Object<fungible_asset::Metadata>
num_avail_chunks: u64
num_transfer_chunks: u64
has_effective_auditor: bool
num_volun_auditors: u64

Functions

`get_ell`

Returns the fixed number of available balance chunks ℓ.

fun get_ell(): u64

Implementation

inline fun get_ell(): u64 { get_num_available_chunks() }

`get_n`

Returns the fixed number of transfer (pending) balance chunks n.

fun get_n(): u64

Implementation

inline fun get_n(): u64 { get_num_pending_chunks() }

`assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed`

Validates the statement structure.

Expected point count: 4 + 4ℓ + 3n + (has_eff ? 1+ℓ+n : 0) + num_volun*(1+n)

fun assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed(stmt: &sigma_protocol_statement::Statement<sigma_protocol_transfer::Transfer>, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64)

Implementation

fun assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed(
    stmt: &Statement<Transfer>, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64,
) {
    let ell = get_ell();
    let n = get_n();
    let num_points = stmt.get_points().length();

    let expected_num_points = 4 + 4 * ell + 3 * n
        + if (has_effective_auditor) { 1 + ell + n } else { 0 }
        + num_volun_auditors * (1 + n);
    assert!(num_points == expected_num_points, e_wrong_num_points());
    assert!(stmt.get_scalars().length() == 0, e_wrong_num_scalars());
}

`new_session`

public(friend) fun new_session(sender: &signer, recipient: address, asset_type: object::Object<fungible_asset::Metadata>, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64): sigma_protocol_transfer::TransferSession

Implementation

public(friend) fun new_session(
    sender: &signer,
    recipient: address,
    asset_type: Object<Metadata>,
    has_effective_auditor: bool,
    num_volun_auditors: u64,
): TransferSession {
    TransferSession {
        sender: signer::address_of(sender),
        recipient,
        asset_type,
        num_avail_chunks: get_num_available_chunks(),
        num_transfer_chunks: get_num_pending_chunks(),
        has_effective_auditor,
        num_volun_auditors,
    }
}

`new_transfer_statement`

Creates a transfer statement, optionally including effective and voluntary auditor components.

Points (base): [G, H, ek_sender, ek_recip, old_P[1..ℓ], old_R[1..ℓ], new_P[1..ℓ], new_R[1..ℓ], amount_P[1..n], amount_R_sender[1..n], amount_R_recip[1..n]] If effective: + [ek_eff_aud, new_R_eff_aud[1..ℓ], amount_R_eff_aud[1..n]] For each voluntary auditor t: + [ek_volun_auds[t], amount_R_volun_auds[t][1..n]]

For no effective auditor, pass option::none() for compressed_ek_eff_aud and ensure amount / new_balance have empty effective-auditor R components. For no voluntary auditors, pass an empty vector for compressed_ek_volun_auds.

public(friend) fun new_transfer_statement(compressed_ek_sender: ristretto255::CompressedRistretto, compressed_ek_recip: ristretto255::CompressedRistretto, compressed_old_balance: &confidential_balance::CompressedBalance<confidential_balance::Available>, compressed_new_balance: &confidential_balance::CompressedBalance<confidential_balance::Available>, compressed_amount: &confidential_amount::CompressedAmount, compressed_ek_eff_aud: &option::Option<ristretto255::CompressedRistretto>, compressed_ek_volun_auds: &vector<ristretto255::CompressedRistretto>): (sigma_protocol_statement::Statement<sigma_protocol_transfer::Transfer>, vector<ristretto255::RistrettoPoint>, confidential_balance::Balance<confidential_balance::Pending>)

Implementation

public(friend) fun new_transfer_statement(
    compressed_ek_sender: CompressedRistretto,
    compressed_ek_recip: CompressedRistretto,
    compressed_old_balance: &CompressedBalance<Available>,
    compressed_new_balance: &CompressedBalance<Available>,
    compressed_amount: &CompressedAmount,
    compressed_ek_eff_aud: &Option<CompressedRistretto>,
    compressed_ek_volun_auds: &vector<CompressedRistretto>,
): (Statement<Transfer>, vector<RistrettoPoint>, Balance<Pending>) {
    let has_eff = compressed_ek_eff_aud.is_some();
    let num_volun = compressed_ek_volun_auds.length();

    // Validate auditor counts before expensive statement construction
    assert!(
        compressed_amount.num_volun_auditors_compressed() == num_volun,
        error::invalid_argument(E_AUDITOR_COUNT_MISMATCH)
    );
    assert!(
        compressed_amount.has_effective_auditor_compressed() == has_eff,
        error::invalid_argument(E_AUDITOR_COUNT_MISMATCH)
    );
    assert!(
        compressed_new_balance.get_compressed_R_aud().length() == if (has_eff) { get_num_available_chunks() } else { 0 },
        error::invalid_argument(E_AUDITOR_COUNT_MISMATCH)
    );
    assert!(
        compressed_amount.get_compressed_R_volun_auds().all(|r| r.length() == get_n()),
        error::invalid_argument(E_AUDITOR_COUNT_MISMATCH)
    );

    let ell = get_ell();
    let n = get_n();
    let e = error::internal(E_STATEMENT_BUILDER_INCONSISTENCY);

    let b = new_builder();
    assert!(b.add_point(ristretto255::basepoint_compressed()) == IDX_G, e);                                            // G
    assert!(b.add_point(confidential_balance::get_encryption_key_basepoint_compressed()) == IDX_H, e);         // H
    assert!(b.add_point(compressed_ek_sender) == IDX_EK_SENDER, e);                                                       // ek_sender
    assert!(b.add_point(compressed_ek_recip) == IDX_EK_RECIP, e);                                                         // ek_recip
    assert!(b.add_points(compressed_old_balance.get_compressed_P()) == START_IDX_OLD_P, e);                            // old_P
    assert!(b.add_points(compressed_old_balance.get_compressed_R()) == START_IDX_OLD_P + ell, e);                      // old_R
    let (idx, new_balance_P) = b.add_points_cloned(compressed_new_balance.get_compressed_P()); // new_P
    assert!(idx == START_IDX_OLD_P + 2 * ell, e);
    assert!(b.add_points(compressed_new_balance.get_compressed_R()) == START_IDX_OLD_P + 3 * ell, e);                  // new_R
    let (idx, amount_P) = b.add_points_cloned(compressed_amount.get_compressed_P());           // amount_P
    assert!(idx == START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell, e);
    assert!(b.add_points(compressed_amount.get_compressed_R_sender()) == START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + n, e);            // amount_R_sender
    let (idx, recip_R) = b.add_points_cloned(compressed_amount.get_compressed_R_recip());      // amount_R_recip
    assert!(idx == START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 2 * n, e);

    // Effective auditor: ek, new_R[1..ℓ], amount_R[1..n]
    let idx_eff_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n;
    if (has_eff) {
        let ek_eff = *compressed_ek_eff_aud.borrow();
        assert!(b.add_point(ek_eff) == idx_eff_start, e);                                                     // ek_eff_aud
        assert!(b.add_points(compressed_new_balance.get_compressed_R_aud()) == idx_eff_start + 1, e);      // new_R_eff_aud
        assert!(b.add_points(compressed_amount.get_compressed_R_eff_aud()) == idx_eff_start + 1 + ell, e); // amount_R_eff_aud
    };

    // Voluntary auditors: for each, append [ek_volun_aud, amount_R_volun_aud[1..n]]
    let idx_volun_start = idx_eff_start + if (has_eff) { 1 + ell + n } else { 0 };
    let compressed_R_volun_auds = compressed_amount.get_compressed_R_volun_auds();
    vector::range(0, num_volun).for_each(|i| {
        let expected_idx = idx_volun_start + i * (1 + n);
        let ek_volun = compressed_ek_volun_auds[i];
        assert!(b.add_point(ek_volun) == expected_idx, e);                             // ek_volun_aud
        assert!(b.add_points(&compressed_R_volun_auds[i]) == expected_idx + 1, e);  // amount_R_volun_aud
    });

    let stmt = b.build();
    assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed(&stmt, has_eff, num_volun);
    let recip_pending = new_pending_from_p_and_r(amount_P, recip_R);
    (stmt, new_balance_P, recip_pending)
}

`psi`

The combined homomorphism $\psi$ for the transfer relation (see module-level doc for full definition).

fun psi(stmt: &sigma_protocol_statement::Statement<sigma_protocol_transfer::Transfer>, w: &sigma_protocol_witness::Witness, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64): sigma_protocol_representation_vec::RepresentationVec

Implementation

fun psi(
    stmt: &Statement<Transfer>, w: &Witness,
    has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64,
): RepresentationVec {
    // WARNING: Crucial for security
    assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed(stmt, has_effective_auditor, num_volun_auditors);

    let ell = get_ell();
    let n = get_n();

    // WARNING: Crucial for security
    let expected_witness_len = 1 + 2 * ell + 2 * n;
    assert!(w.length() == expected_witness_len, e_wrong_witness_len());

    let b_powers_ell = get_b_powers(ell);
    let b_powers_n = get_b_powers(n);

    let dk = *w.get(IDX_DK);

    let reprs = vector[];

    // === R^veiled_withdraw part ===

    // 1. dk · ek_sender
    reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(IDX_EK_SENDER, dk));

    // 2. new_a[i] · G + new_r[i] · H
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        let new_a_i = *w.get(1 + i);
        let new_r_i = *w.get(1 + ell + i);
        reprs.push_back(new_representation(vector[IDX_G, IDX_H], vector[new_a_i, new_r_i]));
    });

    // 3. new_r[i] · ek_sender
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        let new_r_i = *w.get(1 + ell + i);
        reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(IDX_EK_SENDER, new_r_i));
    });

    // 3b. (effective auditor only) new_r[i] · ek_eff_aud
    if (has_effective_auditor) {
        let idx_ek_eff_aud = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n;
        vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
            let new_r_i = *w.get(1 + ell + i);
            reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(idx_ek_eff_aud, new_r_i));
        });
    };

    // 4. Balance equation: dk · ⟨B, old_R⟩ + (⟨B, new_a⟩ + ⟨B, v⟩) · G
    let idx_old_R_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + ell;
    let point_idxs = vector[];
    let scalars = vector[];

    // dk · B^i · old_R[i]
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        point_idxs.push_back(idx_old_R_start + i);
        scalars.push_back(dk.scalar_mul(&b_powers_ell[i]));
    });

    // new_a[i] · B^i · G
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        let new_a_i = *w.get(1 + i);
        point_idxs.push_back(IDX_G);
        scalars.push_back(new_a_i.scalar_mul(&b_powers_ell[i]));
    });

    // v[j] · B^j · G (the secret transfer amount)
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        let v_j = *w.get(1 + 2 * ell + j);
        point_idxs.push_back(IDX_G);
        scalars.push_back(v_j.scalar_mul(&b_powers_n[j]));
    });

    reprs.push_back(new_representation(point_idxs, scalars));

    // === R_eq part ===

    let idx_v_start = 1 + 2 * ell;
    let idx_r_start = 1 + 2 * ell + n;

    // 5. v[j] · G + r[j] · H
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        let v_j = *w.get(idx_v_start + j);
        let r_j = *w.get(idx_r_start + j);
        reprs.push_back(new_representation(vector[IDX_G, IDX_H], vector[v_j, r_j]));
    });

    // 6. r[j] · ek_sender
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        let r_j = *w.get(idx_r_start + j);
        reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(IDX_EK_SENDER, r_j));
    });

    // 7. r[j] · ek_recip
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        let r_j = *w.get(idx_r_start + j);
        reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(IDX_EK_RECIP, r_j));
    });

    // 7b. (effective auditor only) r[j] · ek_eff_aud
    if (has_effective_auditor) {
        let idx_ek_eff_aud = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n;
        vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
            let r_j = *w.get(idx_r_start + j);
            reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(idx_ek_eff_aud, r_j));
        });
    };

    // 7c. (voluntary auditors) r[j] · ek_volun_aud_t, for each voluntary auditor t
    let idx_volun_auds_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n
        + if (has_effective_auditor) { 1 + ell + n } else { 0 };
    vector::range(0, num_volun_auditors).for_each(|i| {
        let idx_ek_volun_aud = idx_volun_auds_start + i * (1 + n);
        vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
            let r_j = *w.get(idx_r_start + j);
            reprs.push_back(repr_scaled(idx_ek_volun_aud, r_j));
        });
    });

    // WARNING: Crucial for security
    assert!(reprs.length() == expected_output_len(ell, n, has_effective_auditor, num_volun_auditors), e_wrong_output_len());
    new_representation_vec(reprs)
}

`expected_output_len`

fun expected_output_len(ell: u64, n: u64, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64): u64

Implementation

fun expected_output_len(ell: u64, n: u64, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64): u64 {
    2 + 2 * ell + 3 * n + (if (has_effective_auditor) { ell + n } else { 0 }) + num_volun_auditors * n
}

`f`

The transformation function $f$ for the transfer relation (see module-level doc for full definition).

fun f(_stmt: &sigma_protocol_statement::Statement<sigma_protocol_transfer::Transfer>, has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64): sigma_protocol_representation_vec::RepresentationVec

Implementation

fun f(
    _stmt: &Statement<Transfer>,
    has_effective_auditor: bool, num_volun_auditors: u64,
): RepresentationVec {
    let ell = get_ell();
    let n = get_n();
    let b_powers_ell = get_b_powers(ell);

    let idx_new_P_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 2 * ell;
    let idx_new_R_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 3 * ell;
    let idx_amount_P_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell;
    let idx_amount_R_sender_start = idx_amount_P_start + n;
    let idx_amount_R_recip_start = idx_amount_R_sender_start + n;

    let reprs = vector[];

    // === R^veiled_withdraw part ===

    // 1. H
    reprs.push_back(repr_point(IDX_H));

    // 2. new_P[i]
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_new_P_start + i));
    });

    // 3. new_R[i]
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_new_R_start + i));
    });

    // 3b. (effective auditor only) new_R_eff_aud[i]
    if (has_effective_auditor) {
        let idx_ek_eff_aud = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n;
        let idx_new_R_eff_aud_start = idx_ek_eff_aud + 1;
        vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
            reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_new_R_eff_aud_start + i));
        });
    };

    // 4. ⟨B, old_P⟩ (no -v·G because v is secret)
    let point_idxs = vector[];
    let scalars = vector[];
    vector::range(0, ell).for_each(|i| {
        point_idxs.push_back(START_IDX_OLD_P + i);
        scalars.push_back(b_powers_ell[i]);
    });
    reprs.push_back(new_representation(point_idxs, scalars));

    // === R_eq part ===

    // 5. amount_P[j]
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_amount_P_start + j));
    });

    // 6. amount_R_sender[j]
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_amount_R_sender_start + j));
    });

    // 7. amount_R_recip[j]
    vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
        reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_amount_R_recip_start + j));
    });

    // 7b. (effective auditor only) amount_R_eff_aud[j]
    if (has_effective_auditor) {
        let idx_amount_R_eff_aud_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n + 1 + ell;
        vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
            reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_amount_R_eff_aud_start + j));
        });
    };

    // 7c. (voluntary auditors) amount_R_volun_aud_t[j], for each voluntary auditor t
    let idx_volun_auds_start = START_IDX_OLD_P + 4 * ell + 3 * n
        + if (has_effective_auditor) { 1 + ell + n } else { 0 };
    vector::range(0, num_volun_auditors).for_each(|i| {
        let idx_amount_R_volun_aud_start = idx_volun_auds_start + i * (1 + n) + 1;
        vector::range(0, n).for_each(|j| {
            reprs.push_back(repr_point(idx_amount_R_volun_aud_start + j));
        });
    });

    // Note: Not needed for security, since a mismatched f(X) length will be caught in the verifier. But good practice
    // for catching mistakes *early* when implementing your f(X).
    assert!(reprs.length() == expected_output_len(ell, n, has_effective_auditor, num_volun_auditors), e_wrong_output_len());
    new_representation_vec(reprs)
}

`assert_verifies`

Asserts that a transfer proof verifies.

public(friend) fun assert_verifies(self: &sigma_protocol_transfer::TransferSession, stmt: &sigma_protocol_statement::Statement<sigma_protocol_transfer::Transfer>, proof: &sigma_protocol_proof::Proof)

Implementation

public(friend) fun assert_verifies(
    self: &TransferSession, stmt: &Statement<Transfer>, proof: &Proof,
) {
    let has_eff = self.has_effective_auditor;
    let num_volun = self.num_volun_auditors;
    assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed(stmt, has_eff, num_volun);

    let success = sigma_protocol::verify(
        new_domain_separator(@aptos_framework, chain_id::get(), PROTOCOL_ID, bcs::to_bytes(self)),
        |_X, w| psi(_X, w, has_eff, num_volun),
        |_X| f(_X, has_eff, num_volun),
        stmt,
        proof
    );

    assert!(success, error::invalid_argument(E_INVALID_TRANSFER_PROOF));
}

sigma_protocol_transfer - [devnet]

The transfer NP relation (Rtxfer−\mathcal{R}^{-}_\mathsf{txfer}Rtxfer−​)

Notation

The relation

Homomorphism

Constants

Structs

Transfer

TransferSession

Functions

get_ell

get_n

assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed

new_session

new_transfer_statement

psi

expected_output_len

f

assert_verifies

The transfer NP relation ( $\mathcal{R}^{-}_\mathsf{txfer}$ )

`Transfer`

`TransferSession`

`get_ell`

`get_n`

`assert_transfer_statement_is_well_formed`

`new_session`

`new_transfer_statement`

`psi`

`expected_output_len`

`f`

`assert_verifies`